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INFORMAL LAND TITLES: SNOWDEN V 
BAKER (1844) 
Bruce Kercher* 
Snowden v Baker (1844) concerned the judicial recognition of informal land titles. This article 
compares the treatment of this broad question in Newfoundland and New South Wales, with 
Snowden v Baker. 
In Newfoundland and New South Wales, informal titles gained legal recognition. This happened in 
Newfoundland through judicial creativity, including statutory interpretation. In New South Wales, 
the formal law was applied more strictly, but was softened when commissioners were appointed to 
assess whether Crown discretion should be exercised in favour of those dispossessed due to 
informality. 
Both methods were used in New Zealand, where the informal titles of British settlers derived from 
sales by Māori land owners. Titles purchased from Māori owners were declared null and void 
unless based on Crown grants. As in New South Wales, commissioners were appointed to advise 
whether such grants should be made. In Snowden v Baker, Martin CJ used statutory interpretation 
to take a further step, by holding that titles derived from Māori sales had a contingent validity until 
affirmed or denied by the Crown. 
The aim of this article is to place Snowden v Baker (1844)1 in an imperial context, by comparing 
it with the case law of two other colonies, Newfoundland and New South Wales. This is based on an 
earlier book chapter about land law in those two colonies,2 which attempted to compare the 
decisions of Francis Forbes, Chief Justice in both places. This article attempts to expand the 
comparison by drawing in New Zealand. The principal question is how were informal views of land 
  
*  Emeritus Professor of Law, Macquarie University. 
1  Snowden v Baker, Supreme Court Auckland, 20 January 1844 per Martin CJ, reported in Daily Southern 
Cross (Auckland, 27 January 1844) at 2. 
2  B Kercher and J Young "Formal and Informal Law in Two New Lands: Land Law in Newfoundland and 
New South Wales under Francis Forbes" in Christopher English (ed) Essays in the History of Canadian 
Law: Volume IX: Two Islands, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island (University of Toronto Press, 
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holding treated in the courts? Was there a clash between informal and formal views of law, and if 
so, how was it resolved? 
Before examining the operation of informal law in Newfoundland and New South Wales, it is 
necessary to give a brief statement of the facts in Snowden v Baker. On 16 May 1840, Snowden 
entered into an agreement with Baker to sell him some pieces of land at Wangaroa, as well as 
certain trees growing on another piece of land. Baker entered into possession of the land 
immediately after the execution of the agreement, and upon paying half of the purchase price. 
Snowden's title was not derived from the Crown, but from a sale to him by the original Māori 
holders of the land. The problem for the parties was that four months earlier, Governor Gipps of 
New South Wales had declared that all titles to land in New Zealand were null and void except 
those derived from the Crown. There was provision, however, for some recognition of purchases 
from Māori before the date of the proclamation. This was later confirmed if not clarified by an Act 
of the New South Wales legislature, and later again by the New Zealand legislature. 
The vendor Snowden was the plaintiff, seeking the recovery of £500, the remainder of the 
purchase price of £1,000. Was Baker required to pay the balance of the price? More broadly, what 
was it that Snowden had purported to sell to Baker? The parties obviously thought that a title 
derived from Māori vendors was valuable, but what did the law say? 
I INFORMAL LAW 
Twenty five years ago, an American legal historian, Hendrik Hartog, wrote an influential article 
called Pigs and Positivism.3 He was interested in the unruly behaviour of the pig keepers of New 
York. When pigs roamed around the streets, they caused disease and accidents. Regulations were 
passed repeatedly in an attempt to restrict the actions of their owners, but the owners repeatedly 
refused to obey them. Was this simply an instance of law breaking, people taking advantage of a 
lack of regulatory enforcement, or was something else at work? Hartog argued that the pig keepers 
acted through a belief that their actions were somehow lawful. By resisting formal law, they were 
asserting their own informal views of law. 
Hartog was not the only person to make an argument of this kind. In a series of articles,4 EP 
Thompson made similar analyses of English law breakers. He discussed food rioters, smugglers, and 
gleaners among other people. In each case, he argued, the people of England were not merely being 
disobedient. They were asserting their popular customs by refusing to obey laws which, in some 
cases, had made those customs unlawful long after they had been established. These people, too, 
were acting in accordance of their customary views of the law, regardless of the formal law. 
  
3  H Hartog "Pigs and Positivism" (1985) Wisconsin L Rev 899. 
4  Posthumously published in EP Thompson Customs in Common (Penguin Books, London, 1991). 
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This idea of resistance based on popular conceptions of law is particularly useful in a colonial 
context. In places such as Newfoundland, New South Wales, and, this paper will argue, New 
Zealand, the European population had its own ideas of law. Happily, this included the pig keepers of 
early Sydney. Like their counterparts in New York, they often breached the regulations which 
sought to restrict their activities. It might not be a surprise that the convict society in Sydney was 
particularly characterised by law breaking. The governors made orders which sought to restrict the 
issuing of promissory notes, control the use of convict labour, and regulate the sale of land and 
much else. Many of these regulations, along with the common law itself, were breached. Even 
Governor Bligh, the most authoritarian of the New South Wales governors, was unable to enforce 
many of his regulations.5 Ultimately, of course, he was the victim of the greatest example of 
resistance to law: the military coup which overthrew his administration in 1808. 
Of course the most important example of non-state law was that of the indigenous peoples in 
these three colonies. This paper deals with that only obliquely. Future research might fruitfully 
compare the formal law's treatment of indigenous and European informal law. That is not the basis 
of this paper. 
Hartog and Thompson raised the possibility of law breaking being based on popular legal ideas, 
but each of them took only the first step. The next step after that is just as important: what did the 
courts do when faced with law breaking based on popular conceptions of law? Were there some 
occasions in which informal law was adopted by the courts? This is just what happened in early 
New South Wales. Even when there was a direct clash between formal law and popular customs, the 
courts sometimes elevated informal law upwards. This was not confined to the earliest amateur 
judges. Some of the trained barristers who later held colonial judicial office in Sydney occasionally 
did the same. As a result, the law makers of New South Wales sometimes included convicts, officers 
and traders whose apparently unlawful conduct was based on implicit ideas of law.6 
We should not to be too romantic about this idea of law breaking based on dissenting popular 
notions of law. Thompson tended to see heroic impulses in working people, but this impulse was not 
restricted to them. The officers who overthrew Bligh in 1808 argued, presumably through genuine 
belief in at least some cases, that they were enforcing the law through their action in obviously 
breaking it. Nor was law breaking always based on a bona fide belief in the legality of the action. 
Thieves were sometimes simply thieves, hoping to get away with whatever they could. Many of us 
break speed limits, not because we think it is lawful, but because we think we will get away with it. 
And even when people did think their law breaking was justified by some notion of popular customs 
or beliefs, those beliefs were sometimes abhorrent, such as those behind the killings of native 
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people. There seemed to be a genuinely held belief among some people in early New South Wales 
that Aboriginal lives had less value than those of the colonists.7 
It is important, then, to look for some evidence that people were attempting to justify their 
illegal actions by implicit reference to law. Fortunately for this paper, that is particularly easy in the 
case of informal land holding. In the three colonies which studied in this paper, Newfoundland, New 
South Wales and New Zealand, people sometimes held land contrary to expressed government 
policies or formal law. We know that these land holders believed that their titles were in some sense 
valid: they spent money on improving the land or on purchasing it. That would have been unlikely if 
they felt they were merely trespassers. It is not merely a romantic fiction to see these cases as 
examples of the activities described by Hartog and Thompson. 
Land law is especially useful to a study of informal law in colonial societies. Unlike in England, 
colonial land law was not a matter dominated by the rights of the gentry and aristocracy, but 
concerned a broad range of settlers who held land mainly for the generation of income. There were 
other social benefits to holding land in the colonies, but these benefits were very different from 
those in England. Colonial land holding was based on entirely different assumptions, different 
approaches to the utility of land. We should not be surprised to find that those differences led to 
clashes between colonial customs and the received laws of England. 
Many legal historians have found that colonial law quite often differed markedly from that of 
England due to different social and economic conditions.8 That was nowhere more evident than in 
land law. 
II INFORMAL LAND LAW IN NEWFOUNDLAND 
Newfoundland is a very large island off the coast of North America, about the same size as the 
north island of New Zealand. In the first part of the nineteenth century, its principal benefit to 
Britain was not the land itself, which was not well suited to agriculture, but its proximity to the 
fisheries off the coast.9 
  
7  See for instance the attitudes displayed in R v Powell [1799] NSWKR 7 (Court of Criminal Judicature). 
8  See for example BH Mann Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in Early Connecticut (University 
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1987); CH Dayton Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law and Society 
in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1995); D Langum Law and 
Community on the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal 
Traditions, 1821-1846 (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1987); P Karsten Between Law and 
Custom: "High" and "Low" Legal Cultures in the Lands of the British Diaspora, 1600-1900 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002); Robert Baker "Creating Order in the Wilderness: Transplanting the 
English Law to Rupert's Land, 1835-51" (1999) 17 Law and History Review 209; John Pagan Anne 
Orthwood's Bastard: Sex and Law in Early Virginia (Oxford University Press, New York, 2003). 
9  On Newfoundland see Kercher and Young "Informal and Formal Law", above n 2. 
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Between 1817 and 1822, when Francis Forbes was Chief Justice of Newfoundland, it was not 
even a colony. Fishermen sailed to the Grand Banks each summer, using the island for drying their 
fish. The government discouraged permanent residence and land ownership on Newfoundland. It 
wanted the fishermen to return to Britain at the end of each season. Despite this official policy, 
however, they increasingly wintered there from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. What had been 
a migratory fishery was gradually taken over by resident fishermen. By 1817 Newfoundland had a 
permanent population of over 43,000. A combination of popular resistance to official policies on 
land holding and government neglect led to the buying and selling of land on the island. People 
thought they had good title, and put their money where their beliefs were. 
The British policy against permanent residence was reinforced by two statutes governing 
Newfoundland, one in 1699 and the other in 1775.10 Most of the legislation regulated the fishery 
and the comings and goings of fishermen, but some sections referred to land holdings. The 1699 Act 
was ambiguous about land though. It distinguished between land used for the fisheries and other 
land, but did not make clear what the title was in either case. The question of title went to more than 
land holding: if it was something like fee simple, then the island itself approached the status of a 
colony. The policy of the individual governors fluctuated between allowing year round residence, 
and firmly opposing it. Buildings continued to be constructed, some with official approval and many 
not. 
What did the Supreme Court do about these mass breaches of official policies? There was no 
doubt that the fundamental law to be applied in Newfoundland was that of England: under 32 Geo 3 
c 46, s 1 (1792), the Supreme Court was to determine suits at Newfoundland "according to the law 
of England, as far as the same can be applied". (The same formula was adopted for New South 
Wales in 1828.11) Chief Justice Forbes had to find a path between the specific legislation applicable 
to the island, the common law, the policies of the local governors and British government, and the 
customary land holding practices of the people of Newfoundland. (The island had no legislature at 
the time he was in office there.)  
This statutory reception of law formula allowed Forbes some flexibility in the application of 
English law, which he took advantage of in both Newfoundland and, during his later appointment 
there, as Chief Justice of New South Wales. His general approach was to use the laws of England 
when they suited the needs of the colony, and to discard them when he felt they were unsuitable. On 
occasions, he quite explicitly allowed local customs to remain in force even when they breached the 
laws of England.12 
  
10  An Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland 1699 10 and 11 Wm 3 c 25; Newfoundland Fisheries Act 
1775 15 Geo III c 31. 
11  Australian Courts Act 1828 (UK) 9 Geo IV c 83, s 24. 
12  See especially Macdonald v Levy, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 8 March 1833 per Burton J, 
reported in the Sydney Herald (Sydney, 11 March 1833); and see Yonge v Blaikie (1822) 1 Newfoundland 
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Francis Forbes resolved the issue of the status of land titles in this most peculiar British 
possession. The first of these decisions was Williams v Williams (1818),13 in which the question 
concerned the inheritance of land within the fishing area, the land close to the sea. Forbes elevated 
the island's customary practice into formal law, by holding that the simple customary tenure which 
passed from person to person was also sound in law. This could not have been the development of 
the common law through English law's recognition of customs, since that required that the custom 
had been in force since time immemorial, which meant 1189. Instead Forbes' device was to say that 
this tenure was an implied term in contracts. As Forbes put it in R v Row, possession and quiet use 
were the best title to land within the fisheries.14 (Some of the land within the fishery was held as 
permissive occupants of the Crown: the customary title there was good against all but the Crown.15) 
There was more to this than customary title: Forbes found in these cases that the 1699 
legislation applicable to the island gave title to anyone constructing a building on unoccupied 
fishery land after 1865. Land built on before then was held on permissive occupancy, unless it had 
been in continuous occupation since it was first used. If built on before 1685, then abandoned, it 
could only be held by permissive occupancy after then. 
Through statutory interpretation, then, Forbes found that the Royal Instructions denying title to 
land in the island were contrary to law. It was never simply unlawful to own land on the island, any 
more than it was directly illegal to live there permanently. 
That left title away from the coast (outside the fishery), the very great majority of the island. 
Forbes squarely faced this question in R v Kough (1819) 1 Newfoundland Law Reports 172. Until 
then the question had been avoided by Forbes and his predecessors. The Crown, he said, had 
beneficial title over the island, under the classification of occupation (presumably meaning 
settlement). The Crown was the source of titles, as in many colonies. Native title (that of the 
Beothuks) was ignored, as in New South Wales. The assumption was terra nullius. That was not the 
end of the matter, however. 
The Crown brought the action in R v Kough. Forbes held that the statutory doctrine of adverse 
possession applied in Newfoundland: the statutes were 21 James 1 c 14 and 9 Geo 3 c 16. Under the 
former, twenty years' undisturbed and adverse possession of lands by a subject barred the Crown 
from entering the lands and compelled it to establish a strictly legal title. Under the latter, sixty 
  
Law Reports 277 (Nf'land SC); Norris v Carter (1821), Supreme Court of Judicature, Newfoundland, in Sir 
Francis Forbes Decisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Cases Connected with the Trade and 
Fisheries of Newfoundland 1817-1821, Mitchell Library, Sydney (ML), A740 at 248. 
13  1 Newfoundland Law Reports 103 (Nf'land SC), but the judgment is only found in Forbes' unreported 
decisions, ibid. 
14  R v Row (1818) 1 Newfoundland Law Reports 126 (Nf'land SC). 
15  Hoyles v Bland (1819) 1 Newfoundland Law Reports 160 (Nf'land SC), but see the restriction on the 
Crown's rights in R v Row, ibid. 
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years' undisturbed and adverse possession furnished a subject with complete and perfect title, even 
against the Crown. As the land in question had been held for over 20 years, the Crown had to prove 
its title. It was unable to show that it had merely been permissive occupancy. The land was safe 
against the claims of the Crown, and as a result, much of the land in the town was secure from 
arbitrary repossession. 
The people of Newfoundland had found the security of their titles. Within the fisheries, this was 
done by Forbes interpreting the statutes in favour of secure title rather than as the Crown had 
assumed, against it. And in the towns and elsewhere away from the immediate area of the coast, 
basic English land law applied. The Crown's policy of discouraging settlement while allowing it to 
continue in fact had at last caught up with it: even the Crown could lose title if it ignored others ' 
occupation of its lands for long enough. The people of Newfoundland now had it on the island's 
highest judicial authority that it was legal to live permanently there, and to own land there outside 
the fishery even without a formal Crown grant. 
Governor Hamilton referred these decisions to the Crown lawyers in London. To his 
mortification, they upheld the Chief Justice's view. Newfoundland was no longer merely a seasonal 
fishery. It was well on the way to becoming an ordinary colony. 
Land holding in Newfoundland had been carried on in a customary fashion for very many years 
before Forbes arrived. Land within the fisheries was passed from person to person, and away from 
the coast the same applied. The usual conveyances, mortgages and inheritances took place. The 
people of Newfoundland thought their titles were sound, and spent money buying land and building 
on it in practical assertion of that belief. This was all despite the British government's formal policy 
to restrain permanent residence and land holding there. Forbes turned this on its head through a 
combination of the recognition of these popular customs, the adoption of English statute law and the 
interpretation of the island's basic legislation in a way contrary to the views of British government. 
To a large extent, the people of Newfoundland helped to create its most fundamental law, that of the 
right to own and live on its land. 
III INFORMAL LAND LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
Even though New South Wales was established as a penal colony, the British government 
encouraged private land holding from the start. Unlike Newfoundland then, informal titles were not 
based on official discouragement of land holding. 
New South Wales titles were derived from the essentially feudal principle of Crown grants: all 
land was supposedly held from the Crown. The governors had delegated power to make land grants. 
Officers were granted land first, followed by emancipated convicts. Until 1831, there was no initial 
charge for receiving one of these grants. They were, however, conditional on work being done on 
the land, and on the payment of quit rents. As in Newfoundland, the informality of titles in New 
South Wales had nothing to do with indigenous land titles. In both colonies the assumption of both 
officials and the people (with rare exceptions) was what was later called terra nullius. Titles should 
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have been clear in New South Wales. As all titles rested on Crown grants, they should have been 
subject to an easy tracing back to the original grant. That turned out not to be true in practice. 
Informal titles in New South Wales derived from both official and popular legal errors. As in 
Newfoundland, however, the people of New South Wales were so convinced of the legitimacy of 
these dubious titles that they worked the land, mortgaged it and bought it for what passed for good 
currency. (The early colony's money was as doubtful as its land titles.) 
Conflicts between formal and informal land titles began well before Francis Forbes commenced 
sitting as the first Chief Justice in New South Wales in 1824. (He left Newfoundland in 1822, and 
worked in London between then and his next judicial appointment in the penal colony.) In the early 
years of New South Wales, land had a very different meaning from that in England: it was merely a 
place to live on or to grow crops. In some cases, parcels of land were sold for less than the value of 
a horse.16  
This difference was reflected in the custom of buying and selling land in New South Wales.  
People passed over the Crown grant documents in return for the price. The transaction was 
sometimes recorded on the back of the grant document. In 1814, for example, a sharp operator 
known as Dick the Needle (Samuel Phelps) bought a farm for the price of a mare, a foal and £5. He 
was illiterate and so was his seller, Thomas Sanders. Phelps resold the farm to Thomas Jones, but 
then Sanders reclaimed the land. Sanders said he had only leased it to Phelps and that Phelps thus 
had no right to sell the freehold to Jones. Only the Crown grant document was available to show 
who owned the land. Phelps said there had been a written contract of sale when he bought the land, 
but that it was lost. Nor was the initial sale noted on the back of the Crown grant, as the popular 
practice sometimes had it. Despite the flimsiness of this chain of title, the civil court under the 
English barrister, Judge Advocate Ellis Bent, allowed it to stand.17 Recognising the dangers of sales 
based on oral evidence for land titles, the governors had issued orders requiring the writing and 
registration of contracts to sell land. These were ignored in many cases, as in Sanders v Jones. The 
colony's Court of Civil Jurisdiction had to mediate between the formal requirements of sales and the 
popular practice of loose conveyancing. In Sanders v Jones the court decided in favour of popular 
practices over the governors' orders, by holding the sales valid. Ellis Bent allowed popular custom to 
be elevated into formal law, just as Forbes had done in Newfoundland. The governors were left to 
the impotent repetition of orders that land sales contracts were to be in writing and registered. 
Uncertainty of titles had official origins as well. When the governor promised to make a grant, 
the recipient was allowed onto the land in advance of the grant, which became known as permissive 
occupancy. Some recipients sold on the land before the grant was completed. The governors also 
  
16  On land in the early years of the colony, see Kercher "Resistance to Law under Autocracy", above n 5; and 
in the years under Forbes as Chief Justice, see Kercher and Young "Informal and Formal Law", above n 2. 
17  Sanders v Jones [1814] NSWKR 5 (Court of Civil Jurisdiction). 
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allowed permissive occupation by mere verbal authority or by a quick note on applications for 
building plans. The majority of town land was held in this way. Even when grants were made, 
official surveying was sometimes inaccurate. Another problem could be traced back to the 
conditional nature of the grants: when the holder of land breached the conditions of the grant, the 
grant was revoked and the land given to another under a new Crown grant. As a result, there were 
sometimes two circulating land grant documents for one piece of land. Furthermore, beginning with 
the first governor, Arthur Phillip, some of the governors made grants in their own names rather than 
that of the King.18 
The most important defect was possession on permissive occupancy. These very loose titles 
were sold or mortgaged as if they were sound. As noted by Governor Brisbane in 1822: "the general 
feeling in the colony  [is] that the smallest scrap of paper containing a promise of grant [is] 
equivalent, if not superior, to the best title from the Crown".19 
By the time that R v Cooper (1825) came before the New South Wales Supreme Court, Francis 
Forbes was sitting as the colony's first Chief Justice.20 Cooper had applied for a land grant so that he 
could build a distillery. The Surveyor General told him that the governor had approved the issue of a 
grant, and that he could enter the land and commence work. A grant would be made when the 
surveying was completed. Cooper spent over £2000 in improving the land before the governor 
discovered that an error had been made: the land included a stream. As a result, the Crown grant 
was never issued, and the Attorney General commenced an action against Cooper seeking recovery 
of the land. This was the colony's first action for intrusion, a proceeding in the nature of trespass that 
was directed at the Crown recovering land from a subject who was in wrongful occupation. Cooper's 
defence relied on the actions of the surveyor in authorising his possession. He also contended that he 
had taken possession of the land "conformably to the universal practice in the colony". Chief Justice 
Forbes was required to decide between the customary title of the colony and formal English law. 
The result would have surprised the people of Newfoundland: in this case Forbes found for the 
Crown. He held that "grants, to be valid as against the Crown, should be under the great seal and of 
record  No grant could be valid that wanted any of the solemnities thus enjoined". 
The special jury fruitlessly declared that "Mr. Cooper has obtained possession of the land in 
question, in the manner hitherto practiced in the colony". To Forbes, these were merely "loose 
  
18  The latter did not result in litigation. It was resolved by a reissue of the grants in Van Diemen's Land, and 
by colonial legislation validating these informal grants in New South Wales (Limitation of Actions Act 
1836 6 Will IV No 16 (UK)); see CH Currey Sir Francis Forbes (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1968) at 
482-484. 
19  Brisbane to Bathurst, 10 April 1822, Historical Records of Australia: Series I, Governors' Despatches to 
and From England [HRA], Frederick Watson (ed) (Sydney: Committee of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1914-1925), vol 10 at 630. 
20  R v Cooper [1825] NSWKR 2 (SCNSW). 
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usages". He said that the colonial custom could not be formally recognised as part of the common 
law because it derogated from the law. (It was also centuries short of the required longevity for 
recognisable customs.) 
Forbes reached the same decision in R v Payne in 1830.21 This time, the title was also based on 
permissive occupancy, but the land holder had gained possession through subsequent sales. Forbes 
held that such title was not good against the Crown, although he did not state its effect between the 
subjects of the Crown. 
This led to a crisis because the great majority of the land in the colony was held informally. 
Many people were unable to show that their titles derived from a valid Crown grant. In R v West 
(1831 and 1832), the land in question had been held on permissive occupation for over 20 years, yet 
the result was the same. There was no reference to the Statute of James on which Forbes had relied 
in Newfoundland. There, however, the Crown had been unable to show that the land had been held 
in permissive occupancy. Here that would have been easy. The governors made two errors: they 
failed to grant the land formally, and they misled the entire community into thinking that they held 
their lands securely. 
Barristers and juries argued repeatedly against the strict application of English law in these New 
South Wales land cases. In R v Steele (1834) for example, the jurors signed a certificate stating that 
"if the usage of the colony and the equity and good conscience of the defendant's claim had not been 
wholly taken from our consideration by the ruling  we should have unanimously decided, on the 
merits, in favour of the defendant".22 This notion would reappear in legislation, as we are about to 
see. 
Forbes saw the injustice in these cases, despite their conformity to law. In reporting the result in 
R v Cooper, he recommended to the governor that Cooper should have a grant of the land he 
occupied, "under such terms, and with such reservations of the right of the water to the public, as to 
Your Excellency may seem equitable".23 The governors of the penal colony had paternalist 
discretion over many matters. The confirmation of informal land titles became another. 
 This principle of Crown discretion over land titles took statutory form in the New South Wales 
Court of Claims Act 1833.24 This legislation authorised the creation of the Court of Claims, a 
  
21  R v Payne, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 18 March 1830 per Forbes CJ, reported in the Australian 
(Sydney, 19 March 1830). 
22  HRA, above n 19, series 1 vol 18 at 179; R v Steele, 28 October 1834, Supreme Court of New South Wales 
per Forbes CJ, Dowling and Burton JJ, Sydney Herald (Sydney, 20 October 1834). 
23  Forbes to Governor Brisbane, 16 February 1825, Chief Justice's Letter Book, State Records of New South 
Wales, 4/6651, 24 
24  The consolidated Acts of New South Wales gave it this title. Sometimes called the Crown Lands (Claims) 
Act 4 Will IV No 9 (NSW) was later incorporated in (1835) 5 Will IV No 21(NSW) when the court was 
established on a more permanent basis. The same problem of uncertain titles occurred in Van Diemen's 
Land, with the same solution. The Court of Claims there was known as the Caveat Board: Alex C Castles, 
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tribunal specifically designed to investigate and report on claims to land that were based on 
promises of grant from the government. The court's commissioners were to act according to "the 
real justice and good conscience of the case without regard to legal forms and solemnities". They 
could take into account that the person concerned had been in undisputed occupation for ten or 
twenty years. A positive finding meant that the claimants were entitled to treat the land as their 
property. On receipt of their report however, the governors had discretion whether to issue a formal 
grant.25 This legislation was established at the request of Governor Bourke and on the advice of the 
Supreme Court judges (Forbes, Dowling and Burton).26 The principle would become important in 
New Zealand. 
Forbes acted more strictly in New South Wales than he had in Newfoundland, a puzzle which 
needs to be solved.27 He had an ambiguous statute to hang onto in Newfoundland, unlike New 
South Wales, but his attitude in the latter was also much stricter. 
Forbes' strictness in land cases was confined to actions concerning the rights of the Crown. In 
Doe dem Unwin v Salter (1832) the full Court (including Forbes) held that a permissive occupant 
had sufficient title to eject an intruder by the process of the courts. This was repeatedly confirmed 
by the court. The customary title of the colony thus had some legal recognition, though not against 
the Crown. 
IV INFORMAL LAND LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
Snowden v Baker had many of the characteristics shown in the Newfoundland and New South 
Wales cases. The popular belief among the European settlers was that titles derived from Māori 
sales were valid;28 Baker would not have spent £1000 in buying the land otherwise. Despite that, 
there were official doubts, to say the least, about the legal validity of the title.  
Four months before the sale from Snowden to Baker, Governor Gipps of New South Wales 
issued a New Zealand land proclamation dated 19 January 1840.29 It said that the Queen would not 
  
Petrow (ed) Lawless Harvests or God Save the Judges: Van Diemen's Land 1803-55, a Legal History 
(Australian Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, 2007) vol xii at 162-165. 
25  Crown Lands Claim Act, ibid, ss 7 and 12. See Enid Campbell "Promises of Land from the Crown: Some 
Questions of Equity in Colonial Australia" (1994) 13 University of Tasmania Law Review 1; Alex C 
Castles An Australian Legal History (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1982) at 215-216. 
26  See Bourke to Stanley HRA, above n 19, series 1 vol 26 at 177. 
27  Some explanations are suggested by Kercher and Young "Informal and Formal Law", above n 2. Another 
distinction was that there could be no land holding in Newfoundland unless Forbes found a way to 
legitimise it; there was no such concern in New South Wales where Crown grants were often made and it 
was simply a matter of enforcing the correct procedure. 
28  See P McHugh Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1991) at 78. 
29  Apart from the terms of the legislation and of the cases, the following paragraphs are based on Richard 
Boast Buying the Land, Selling the Land: Governments and Maori Land in the North Island 1865-1921 
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acknowledge any titles to land in New Zealand unless derived from a grant in her Majesty's name. 
At the same time the Crown would recognise previous equitable purchases from the native 
inhabitants of the colony and would consider absolutely null and void all future purchases. New 
land titles would only be by Crown grant, while existing ones derived from previous sales by Māori 
needed confirmation by Crown grants. The purpose of this imposition of the doctrine of pre-emption 
was to impose control over an increasing number of purchases from Māori . The proclamation 
referred to the use of commissioners to investigate the pre-existing titles derived from Māori , and 
caused consternation to the New South Wales business community and to the New Zealand 
Company which had invested heavily in speculative purchases from Māori chiefs. The first 
governor in New Zealand, Hobson, later issued similar proclamations, which were followed by the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
As the plaintiff argued in Snowden v Baker, a governor's proclamation alone could not change 
the law of titles to land. The New South Wales Court of Claims Act (or Land Claims Act) of 184030 
settled the matter, replaced in 1841 by the Land Claims Ordinance, very similar legislation passed 
by the New Zealand legislature, following formal separation of the colonies. Section 2 of the 1841 
Ordinance declared and enacted that "all titles to land in the said Colony of New Zealand which are 
held or claimed by virtue of purchases or pretended purchases gifts or pretended gifts conveyances 
or pretended conveyances leases or pretended leases agreements or other titles, either mediately or 
immediately from the chiefs or other individuals or individual of the aboriginal tribes inhabiting the 
said Colony, and which are not or may not hereafter be allowed by Her Majesty, her heirs or 
successors, are and the same shall be absolutely null and void". As in New South Wales itself, the 
governor could appoint commissioners to enquire into the titles, "guided by the real justice and good 
conscience of the case without regard to legal forms and solemnities" (s 6). The governor alone was 
to refer cases to the commissioners (s 5), and they were to make recommendations to the governor 
whether or not to make formal Crown grants. The discretion whether to make the grant was entirely 
that of the governor (s 6). 
As we have seen, the idea of commissioners to investigate the justice of informal claims to land 
came from the New South Wales Court of Claims Act 1833. In that colony, the commissioners were 
created to investigate and report on land claims that were based merely on promises of grants from 
the government. In New Zealand, the 1840 New South Wales Act and 1841 New Zealand Ordinance 
  
(Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2008) at 22-24; see also McHugh, ibid, at 78-79 and 108-109. On 
the politics of land claims derived from Maori sales, see M Belgrave "Pre-emption, the Treaty of Waitangi 
and the Politics of Crown Purchase" (1997) 31 New Zealand Journal of History 23. The terms of the 
proclamation used here are from the judgment of Martin CJ in Snowden v Baker, above n 1. The preamble 
to (1840) 4 Vict No 7 (NSW) noted that the decision not to recognise titles other than those derived from the 
Crown had been made in London on 14 August 1839. 
30  (1840) 4 Vict No 7 (NSW), given this title by the New South Wales consolidated Acts. It was called the 
Land Claims Act in New Zealand: see for example In the Matter of Busby, Supreme Court at Auckland per 
Arney Chief Justice, reported in the Daily Southern Cross (Auckland, 20 April 1860) at 4. 
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used the same mechanism to investigate the justice of claims based originally on sales by Māori to 
Europeans. The aim was to formalise claims to land obtained on "equitable terms" from Māori, and 
which were not prejudicial to the interests of the Queen's subjects settled in New Zealand (s 2; s 3). 
The commissioners were to enquire into the price paid to the original Māori owners, and were not to 
concern themselves with the price paid on subsequent sales (s 5; s 6). On its face, the principal 
concern, then, was with justice to Māori. Under the 1833 New South Wales Act, there was no 
concern with Aborigines, but only with the European settlers. 
The newspaper reports of the decision in Snowden v Baker are comprehensive. In one issue the 
Daily Southern Cross31 presented the special case stated for the court, which was a detailed account 
of the parties' arguments. A later issue of the same newspaper32 gave the judgment, which included 
the Chief Justice's detailed summaries of the governor's proclamation and of the relevant legislation. 
New Zealand was a very new colony in 1844, but if this is typical its newspapers were already 
providing high quality law reports. Not all colonies were as lucky. 
The newspaper reports show that the plaintiff's claim was for the balance of the purchase price. 
The defendant had paid £500 on entering into the contract, and then entered into possession of the 
land. Since that time, he had remained in possession and paid interest on the outstanding balance of 
the price. The contract stated that the conveyance would take place after the price was fully paid. 
Mr Brewer for the plaintiff made a multipronged argument to the court, part of which need not 
concern us. He first argued that the price was payable even if title could not be shown. This turned 
on the question of whether payment of the price was a condition precedent for payment or whether it 
was an independent obligation. 
More importantly for us, the plaintiff argued that his promise was to deliver only the title he 
held, that derived from the natives. That title was valid, he argued, as there was no contention that 
the purchase from the natives was illegal. The governor's proclamation came before the contract of 
sale from Snowden to Baker, but it could not make law. Although it was subsequently repeated and 
clarified by the New South Wales Act of 1840, that legislation was passed after the date of the 
contract. No legislation could have any retrospective effect on an agreement under seal, the plaintiff 
argued. At the date of this agreement, May 1840, a title derived from Māori was the only title 
known in New Zealand. Even if a title derived from the Crown were required under the contract, the 
defendant had waived his right to that title: he had entered into possession, remaining there and 
paying interest on the outstanding balance of the price. 
The defendant replied that the balance of the price was not payable unless title from the Crown 
was given. If not, the defendant and possessors in his position could be ousted by the Crown at any 
time. 
  
31  Daily Southern Cross (Auckland, 16 September 1843) at 3. 
32  Daily Southern Cross (Auckland, 27 January 1844) at 2.  
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Judgment was delivered by Martin CJ, who announced that he had consulted with the newly 
arrived Chapman J before reaching a final decision. 
Chief Justice Martin found for the plaintiff; the balance of the price was payable even though 
the plaintiff's title was not derived from the Crown. He pointed out that the governor's proclamation 
on 14 January 1840 had indicated her Majesty's willingness to recognise equitable purchases from 
Māori made before the date of the proclamation. The New South Wales Act which gave effect to the 
Crown's intention was passed on 4 August 1840, after the date of the contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant. The Chief Justice held that it was not necessary to decide whether the promise to pay 
the price was an independent one, that is, one in which the obligation was to pay regardless of the 
ability to provide the title promised by the other side. Fortunately for us, he decided the matter on a 
broader basis. 
Under the contract, Martin CJ held, the defendant had no right to demand a title based on a 
Crown grant. The contract was entered into three months after the proclamation, which meant that 
the defendant was aware of the difficulties with the title. Even after the New South Wales Act came 
into effect, the defendant took no steps to rescind the contract. His honour rejected the defendant's 
argument that the enforcement of the promise to pay the price would in effect hold that a title to land 
not derived from the Crown was valid and sufficient.  
The case turned on the interpretation of the awkwardly expressed Land Claims Ordinance 1841. 
As stated earlier, s 2 declared and enacted that "all titles to land in the said Colony of New Zealand 
which are held or claimed by virtue of purchases or pretended purchases ... from the ... aboriginal 
tribes inhabiting the said Colony, and which are not or may not hereafter be allowed by Her 
Majesty, her heirs or successors, are and the same shall be absolutely null and void". Despite the 
strength of this legislative statement, Martin CJ interpreted it so that titles such as that held by the 
plaintiff were contingent, and subject to the pleasure of the Crown. He could find nothing in the 
legislation to prevent the Queen's subjects from dealing as freely with these titles as with any other 
class of contingent interests. His honour stated that the proclamation provided differently for 
purchases made after 14 January 1840: the Crown considered such titles to be absolutely null and 
void. They would not be confirmed by Crown grant. Although the date of the original purchase from 
Māori was not known to the court, there was no allegation that it was made after the date of the 
proclamation. On that basis, the plaintiff had contracted to sell a contingent title. 
This decision thus gave some effect to the customary title accepted among the European people 
of New Zealand. Despite the forbidding language of the legislation, the Chief Justice found a way to 
validate the sales of titles derived through Māori sales. The settler population clearly thought that 
such titles had value, and the Chief Justice confirmed that. He could have interpreted the legislation 
to mean that titles derived from Māori sales were a nullity until confirmed by Crown grant. That 
interpretation was open to him due to the clear legislative intention to keep discretion over titles 
entirely in the hands of the governor. Instead, the Chief Justice interpreted the statutory words to 
provide for contingent titles, more than a nullity, and something which could be sold. 
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His honour made clear, however, that the result would not necessarily be the same in cases 
where the holder of the land under such a contingent title had to prove her or his claim to the land. 
In such cases, the Chief Justice held, it might be necessary to prove that the title had been allowed 
by the Crown. He did not go on to consider explicitly the question of whether such titles would be 
valid against the Crown. The answer to that question seems clear, that such contingent titles were 
not sound against the Crown. The contingency in such titles was whether the Crown would confirm 
the title by grant, and it clearly had discretion not to do so. Despite this, the question was litigated in 
the Busby litigation, mentioned below. 
The decision in Snowden v Baker only affected disputes between subjects of the Crown. In those 
cases, the Chief Justice decided, sales of Māori derived titles were valid in the interval between the 
initial pre-1840 purchase from Māori and the Crown's decision to allow or disallow the title in 
question. 
The plaintiff in Snowden v Baker was certainly not alone in asserting the validity of titles 
derived from pre-1840 sales by Māori. As Richard Boast tells us,33 those in Snowden's position 
became a noisy and troublesome pressure group, who wanted their contingent titles confirmed by 
Crown grants. Some of these claims resulted in litigation which appears in the New Zealand's Lost 
Cases website.34 
The best cases of this kind concerned the claims of James Busby.35 In these, Busby went beyond 
the issue in Snowden v Baker. He sought to use his title derived from Māori sales as a direct 
challenge to Crown grants. In Busby v McKenzie (1855) for instance, Busby unsuccessfully asserted 
a Māori based title against the holder of a Crown grant. This rich litigation is examined separately in 
the paper by Fletcher and Elias.36 
Another case of the same kind was R v Taylor (1849), in which there was an attempt to set aside 
a Crown grant to one Beattie. Beattie said he had bought the land from Māori owners before the 
proclamation of Crown sovereignty. His claim was referred to the commissioners under the Land 
  
33  Boast Buying the Land, above n 28, at 24. 
34  For the background to some of these cases, see Belgrave, above n 28, at 30f. 
35  Busby v McKenzie, Supreme Court Auckland, 8 June 1855 per Martin Chief Justice, "Auckland Civil 
Minute Book", 1844-1856, Archives New Zealand, Auckland, BBAE 5635/1a at 309-315; and Supreme 
Court Auckland, 31 October 1855 per Stephen ACJ, reported in the Daily Southern Cross (Auckland, 2 
November 1855) at 2; White v Busby, Supreme Court Auckland, 12 September 1859 per Arney CJ, reported 
in the Daily Southern Cross (Auckland, 30 September 1859) at 2; In the Matter of Busby Supreme Court 
Auckland, 20 March 1860 per Arney CJ, reported in the Daily Southern Cross (Auckland, 20 April 1860) at 
4. 
36  See Fletcher and Elias in this volume. 
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Claims Ordinance 1841.37 This was one of a number of challenges to the actions of the 
commissioners, and in this case it led the court to examine the legislation closely. It held that the 
commissioners were not to make a final decision under the legislation, but merely to make 
recommendations to the governor. The Crown grant was held valid. 
There were several other actions which attempted to challenge Crown grants, some of which 
also concerned challenges to the actions of the commissioners. R v Clarke (1848) was similar to R v 
Taylor: the defendant bought the land from Māori owners before the proclamation of sovereignty, 
the question was referred to the commissioners for report and there was an unsuccessful challenge to 
the subsequent issue of his Crown grant.38 Not all of these challenges were made by rival European 
claimants to land: in Meurant v Keir (1854), a similar challenge to a Crown grant was made by a 
Māori plaintiff.39 
Other challenges to land titles were closer in kind to those made in New South Wales, in that 
they were based on issues other than titles being derived from Māori. In Scott v Grimstone (1848) 
for instance, one of the issues in question was the surveying of the property concerned.40 Dorset v 
Bell (1853) concerned the limits on the powers of the commissioners and governors.41 R v 
McDonald (1849) would also have been familiar to those in Sydney.42 It concerned a governor's 
promise to convey land to the New Zealand Company. Buildings were constructed in the belief that 
the title was sound. The court decided the question in the same way as Forbes CJ had in New South 
Wales: a promise of a grant did not create an interest in land. Only a formal Crown grant under the 
Colonial Seal was sufficient.43 
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42  R v McDonald, Supreme Court Wellington, 20 January 1849 per Chapman J, reported in New Zealand 
Spectator and Cook's Strait Guardian (Wellington, 30 September 1846) at 2. 
43  Other land claims cases included Towgood v Barlow, Supreme Court Wellington, 7 May 1867 per Johnston 
J, reported in the Wellington Independent (Wellington, 9 May 1867) at 3, and 15 June 1867, reported in 
Wellington Independent (Wellington, 18 June 1867) at 4-5; Taine v Fox, Supreme Court Wellington, 21 
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V CONCLUSION 
In all three colonies there was a popular belief in the validity of land titles which were doubtful 
under formal law. In Newfoundland, the title seemed on its face to be a form of squatting. In New 
South Wales, the most significant of these cases concerned titles based on permissive occupancy. 
Only in New Zealand was there any link to native title. The other two colonies were also established 
in the face of very evident native occupation of land, but in the cases discussed here, New Zealand 
alone had native sales as the basis of the informal popular titles.44 
The three colonies' land practices also varied in the extent of popular challenges to official law 
and policies. Newfoundland was most similar to the pig keepers, in that the occupation of land 
directly contradicted the erratically enforced government policy against permanent settlement. New 
South Wales land holders in these cases held their land with the permission of the government – 
squatting cases were a separate category in that colony.45 The breaches of law and policy in New 
South Wales discussed here all concerned the ways in which the land was bought and sold, not the 
fundamental right to occupy it. And in New Zealand, there was no apparent contradiction to official 
policies. The informal titles derived from the period before which the government sought to prohibit 
purchases direct from Māori . 
In all three colonies the Supreme Courts were required to find a path between popular views 
about land titles and official law and policy. In all three, there were cases in which some judicial 
recognition was given to popular titles: the seeming squatters in Newfoundland, the holders under 
dodgy conveyances in New South Wales, and the holders of land based on Māori sales in New 
Zealand. Sometimes colonial people made law well before the age of democracy.  
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